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Abstract
Android malware authors use sophisticated techniques to hide
the malicious intent of their applications. They use cryptography
or obfuscation techniques to avoid detection during static anal-
ysis. They can also avoid detection during a dynamic analysis.
Frequently, the malicious execution is postponed as long as the
malware is not convinced that it is running in a real smartphone
of a real user. However, we believe that dynamic analysis methods
give good results when they really monitor the malware execution.
In this article1, we propose a method to enhance the execution
of the malicious code of unknown malware. We especially target
malware that have triggering protections, for example branching
conditions that wait for an event or expect a specific value for
a variable before triggering malicious execution. In these cases,
solely executing the malware is far from being sufficient. We pro-
pose to force the triggering of the malicious code by combining
two contributions. First, we define an algorithm that automati-
cally identifies potentially malicious code. Second, we propose an
enhanced monkey called GroddDroid, that stimulates the GUI of
an application and forces the execution of some branching con-
ditions if needed. The forcing is used by GroddDroid to push the
execution flow towards the previously identified malicious parts of
the malware and execute it. The source code for our experiments
with GroddDroid is released as free software2. We have verified
on a malware dataset that we investigated manually that the ma-
licious code is accurately executed by GroddDroid. Additionally,
on a large dataset of 100 malware we precisely identify the nature
of the suspicious code and we succeed to execute it at 28%.
1This article is a post-print version of the paper published in the 10th
International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software (MAL-
WARE) with DOI 10.1109/MALWARE.2015.7413692. Personal use of
this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for
all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/repub-
lishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of
any copyrighted component of this work in other works. This work has
received a French government support granted to the COMIN Labs ex-
cellence laboratory and managed by the National Research Agency in the
"Investing for the Future" program under reference ANR-10-LABX-07-01.
2Sources available at http://kharon.gforge.inria.fr
1. Introduction
Between 1% [15] and 9% [9] of Android applications
are identified as malware. CheetahMobile reports that most
of them come from alternative markets where automatic
checks and malware sanitization procedures are missing [9].
Most of the time, users are infecting their own smartphone
with a repackaged version of a legitimate application con-
taining malicious code. Identifying a potential malware by
studying the required permissions becomes difficult, espe-
cially because developers have difficulties to use permis-
sions accurately [22].
To prevent the distribution of malware, Google has de-
veloped a service called Bouncer that analyzes statically
and dynamically applications submitted on Google Play.
Static analysis has strong limitations since malware resorts
to a lot of techniques to hide the malicious behavior within
legitimate applications. They can obfuscate their code, use
reflection or dynamic libraries. Additionally, a lot of in-
teresting information are only available at runtime, for ex-
ample the content and the recipient of a SMS, the content
of a message received by a remote server, etc. Dynamic
analysis can bring more information on malware behaviors.
Research efforts have to be done on the setup of efficient
dynamic analysis platforms as it is not reliable to deploy
large scale analysis tools on user’s devices.
Dynamic analysis faces several problems. Malware can
load their code dynamically [20], detect a virtual sandbox-
ing of the application [23], use transformation attacks to es-
cape signature based techniques [21]. Thus, the effective-
ness of dynamic analysis for building real time detection
tools is an interesting and active debate. Dynamic analysis
tools are only useful if the malware is executed during the
analysis. If the environment is virtualized, if the network is
not setup, or if some APIs are missing, some simple checks
may lead a malware to prevent the run of its code. We think
that this sub-problem should be addressed, and is a first im-
portant step for dynamic detection solutions.
In this article, we propose a methodology and a tool
called GroddDroid to automatically trigger and execute sus-
picious parts of the code of an application: our goal is to
take as input an application, run it on a real smartphone
and modify as few as possible the control flow of the ap-
plication in order to force the execution of the suspicious
part of the code. To achieve such a goal, we lead a two
step approach. First, we identify the suspicious parts of the
bytecode and compute a score (indicator of risk) for each
function of the malware. Second, we introduce a new GUI
stimulator, called GroddDroid, which runs the application
by clicking on all possible detected buttons. Finally, we
identify the remaining parts of the malware that has not been
executed and we force the required control flow statements
to push the flow to the unexecuted parts previously scored.
Our experimental results show that our GroddDroid ex-
ecutor has better code coverage than the Monkey [14] and
A3E [7]. Combined with the control flow forcing method,
the triggering of malicious code increases and we measured
this improvement on a dataset of malware for which we
have manually identified the malicious parts. On a larger
dataset we also show that GroddDroid succeeds in execut-
ing the suspicious parts previously detected.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the problem of executing malware and presents a literature
review. Section 3 gives a comprehensive overview of our
solution. Three sections describe the different features of
GroddDroid: Section 4 explains how the malicious code is
targeted, Section 5 describes how is automatized the inter-
action with the GUI of the applications and finally Section 6
details how GroddDroid can force branches during the exe-
cution in order to execute the previously detected suspicious
code. Section 7 presents our experimental results based on
two datasets, a small one and a large one, and finally Sec-
tion 8 concludes the article.
2. State of the art
As the production of Android malware is increasing,
writing malware is becoming a regular job: Allix et al. ex-
plain that, most of malicious codes are copy paste of on-
line tutorials or variation of the same original malicious
code [2]. Thus, families of malware can be rebuilt [12] and
we can measure the improvements of the sophistication of
each family [4].
Two main approaches can be considered to inspect the
behavior of malware: static approaches that analyze the
available material of the malware as its bytecode, its re-
sources, and dynamic approaches that run the malware and
monitors its behavior. As reported in [18], different mon-
itoring techniques can be used. Tainting techniques fol-
lows the information in the studied application [6, 11]. Vir-
tual machine events crafting, system calls monitoring and
method tracing can be implemented in the Dalvik virtual
machine or at kernel level [8].
Bläsing et al. propose an hybrid approach, with a first
static step and a second one that is dynamic and run in an
emulator [8]. The first step statically analyzes the malware
to extract relevant patterns such as JNI calls, binary execu-
tors, usage of reflection, etc. Then, the second step runs
a dynamic analysis and monitors low levels system calls.
Nevertheless, the two steps does not cooperate and the ben-
efits of the static analysis is not reused for the dynamic
step. We believe that dynamic approaches are promising
approaches as long as they really observe the malicious be-
havior of a malware. However, malware authors are full of
resources to evade dynamic approaches simply in delaying
their malicious execution.
Well known analysis platforms like Andrubis [16] or
SmartDroid [24] do not address this problem. They trig-
ger all possible activities and generates possible interesting
events. But if the malicious code is protected, for instance
waiting a special event, the malicious code will never been
executed. Thus, running automatically an ordinary applica-
tion is a difficult challenge. As the Monkey stimulator [14]
gives insufficient results, researchers have also contributed
to automate the interactions with the GUI. In [10], Choud-
hary et al. give an overview of the current input generators
for Android. Random strategies can choose graphical ele-
ments or choose system events in order to stress the applica-
tion. For example, DynoDroid [17] repeats a loop "observe-
select-execute" and implements different strategies for the
selection phase. Model-based exploration strategies con-
sider each activity as a state and each event is a possible
transition. For example, AndroidRipper [3] discovers new
states and generates the possible transitions dynamically
during the execution.
Additionally, sophisticated techniques use combinations
of methods to help the dynamic exploration, e.g. using the
exploration strategy of A3E’s tool of Azim et al. [7]. Their
tool calls the activities that can be triggered by Intents if
they are detected in the manifest of the application. This is
a simple combination of static analysis and dynamic execu-
tion that intends to increase the covering of code.
Finally, since malware developers frequently reuse the
same benign application to embed different malicious
codes, the authors proposes PuppetDroid which is a solution
that reuses previous recorded interactions if the repackaged
application’s GUI looks similar [13]. This example shows
that the code coverage of the application is not the best way
to study malware.
In this article, we do not care about covering the benign
part of the code. Thus, we base our proposal on the idea
that if we identify the parts of the code that are possibly
malicious, and if a normal execution does not trigger this
part of the code, then we should force the flow of execution
in order to reach this part during subsequent executions. We
show how a prior static analysis helps dynamic analysis in
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Figure 1: Overview of the GroddDroid framework
public static int
syracuse(int) {
int $i0, $i1;
$i0 := @parameter0: int;
label1:
if $i0 != 1 goto label2;
return $i0;
label2:
$i1 = $i0 if $i1 != 0
goto label3;
$i0 = $i0 / 2;
goto label1;
label3:
$i1 = $i0 * 3;
$i0 = $i1 + 1;
goto label1;
}
Listing 1: Jimple
public static int
syracuse(int n) {
while (n != 1) {
if (n n /= 2;
else
n = n*3 + 1;
}
return n;
}
Listing 2: Original
Java code
increasing its accuracy. The contribution of our article is
precisely a static analysis that identifies the bytecode that
seems dangerous followed by an automatic execution driven
by the first analysis. In the next sections, after giving an
overview of our solution, we depict all the components that
achieve such a goal.
3. Overview
Figure 1 gives an overview of our proposal. Our ap-
proach can be divided into three different steps. First, we in-
strument the suspected application to observe the behavior
of the application under analysis and get a reference execu-
tion. This instrumentation enables to learn which branches
of the execution are taken during a run (see Control Flow
Tracer on Figure 1). Thus, the GroddDroid runner executes
the new APK on a smartphone in order to get the reference
execution.
The second step consists in identifying the possible ma-
licious code inside the malware using a static analysis of its
bytecode (Malicious Code Targeting).
During the third step, GroddDroid uses the execution log
of the reference execution to determine which control flow
has to be forced to reach the parts of the code identified as
malicious. A new APK is produced where the control flow
is modified accordingly. The GroddDroid runner executes
the new APK and new logs are generated. This step can be
repeated for processing all the malicious parts of the identi-
fied code.
In the following, Section 4 describes the heuristic that
identifies the potential malicious code, Section 5 explains
how the reference execution is automated and Section 6
presents how the control flow is forced.
4. Automatic identification of malicious code
Android applications are packaged and distributed as
APK files. These files are archives that do not contain the
original Java code but only the pre-compiled Dalvik byte-
code and the resources used by the application. In this arti-
cle we propose a heuristic for targeting directly suspicious
bytecode.
4.1. Handling application’s bytecode
We extract the bytecode by using the Soot framework [5]
that is able to represent the Java bytecode as several inter-
mediate representations. The main representation is based
on the Jimple language, that has the same semantic as the
Java language but with fewer instructions (only 15). This re-
duced set of instructions makes Jimple a practical language
for static analysis and optimizations. Listing 1 (resp. 2)
shows an example of the Jimple (resp. Java) representa-
tion of a method syracuse. The type is still available
and control flow constructs are similar: the while loop is
simplified with a conditional jump and a backward jump.
With this Jimple representation, Soot allows to program-
matically manipulate the application code: each instruction
is wrapped into an object that extends a Unit object. In the
example of Listing 1, an instruction such as $i1 = $i0
% 2; is represented by an AssignStmt object (for as-
signment statement), a subclass of Unit, from which some
values can be accessed, like the target of the assignment
($i1) and the RemExpr (for remainder expression) of the
assigned operation. The control flow of a program can also
be analyzed through the conditional and unconditional jump
instructions IfStmt and GotoStmt.
In order to target suspicious code, we propose to search
some particular types that are more frequently encountered
in malware. For extracting those types, we use Soot’s ability
to give the types used in each instruction of the program.
Table 1: Proposed risk scores by class categories
Category Associated classes Score
SMS android.telephony.SmsManager 50
Telephony android.telephony.TelephonyManager 20
Binary java.lang.Runtime
java.lang.Process
java.lang.System
10
Dynamic dalvik.system.BaseDexClassLoader
dalvik.system.PathClassLoader
dalvik.system.DexClassLoader
dalvik.system.DexFile
10
Reflection java.lang.reflect.* 3
Crypto javax.crypto.*
java.security.spec.*
3
Network java.net.Socket
java.net.ServerSocket
java.net.HttpURLConnection
java.net.JarURLConnection
3
4.2. Suspicious code targeting
Aafer et al. showed that some Java methods of the An-
droid API are noticeably more frequently used in malware
code than in benign applications code [1]. The difference
can go from 20% to 50% of additional usage in the case of
some sensible API calls such as getSubscriberId. In
the following, we briefly summarize the API calls that are
the most impacted by this difference and that will be the
core of our scoring function (see [1] for full statistics).
android.telephony.TelephonyManager:
getSubscriberId and getDeviceId give a unique
identifier of the phone. getLine1Number gives the
phone number associated with the SIM card.
android.app.Service: while services are perfectly com-
mon in benign applications, some overridden methods like
onCreate frequently contain malicious code.
android.context.pm.PackageManager: this component
allows listing of installed applications and their installation.
android.telephony.SmsManager: this class contains
sendTextMessage, that allows to send send a SMS.
java.lang.{Runtime,Process}: these standard components
of Java allow the application to execute native programs
(exec), monitor their output (getOutputStream) and
their shutdown (waitFor).
We propose to compute a risk score for each method in
the bytecode: we compute the sum of the score associated
to each Unit of the method using the scoring constants of
Table 1. This table defines a score value for each suspicious
class following on the observations of Aafer et al. [1]. Our
heuristic is that malicious code has a higher probability to
be the code with the highest score.
Table 2: Scoring result of the SaveMe malware
Method Nb
Units
Score
com.savemebeta.GTSTSR: void CHECK() 2 100
com.savemebeta.SCHKMS: void fetchContacts() 2 100
com.savemebeta.Scan: int uploadFile(java.lang.String) 12 36
com.savemebeta.Analyse: void onCre-
ate(android.os.Bundle)
4 32
com.savemebeta.CHECKUPD: void onCreate() 4 32
com.savemebeta.CO: void onCreate() 2 16
We give an example of scoring result in Table 2 for a
sample of the SaveMe 3 malware family. After inspecting
manually the results, it appears that the heuristic success-
fully targets the malicious methods of this malware if we
exclude the reflection class. Indeed, this class is used in
many parts of application and the scoring was less accurate
if reflection was considered, even with a low score.
Note that the score is high for two methods that have
only two suspicious calls in it (TelephonyManager). On
the contrary, the uploadFile method has 12 calls using
HttpURLConnection. Of course, false positive target-
ing may happen, i.e. benign code targeted instead of the
malicious code that is elsewhere in the application. Never-
theless, as shown in Section 7.1, our experimental results
and manual checks show that the targeting works well.
5. Stimulating the graphical user interface
As discussed in the state of the art, many tools have cov-
ered the problem of stimulating the graphical interface in
order to have a good coverage of an application. Unfor-
tunately, most of the open source software that are cited
in [10] are no longer supported. Thus, it becomes tech-
nically difficult to use the previous contributions in order
to execute modern malware that use new versions of An-
droid’s APIs. For these reasons, we have chosen to recode
a GUI runner, called the GroddDroid runner and to keep the
Monkey [14] as a point of comparison.
5.1. Run by a monkey
The Monkey hits randomly the graphical interface and
should be stopped arbitrarily because there is not guarantee
that all possible activities have been visited.
The Monkey is often combined with the generation of
events like SMS or phone calls and by starting all possible
activities and services. Using such techniques [16] helps the
Monkey but cannot achieve good results as we show at the
end of the section.
3http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/
socialpath-malware-backs-up-to-cc
5.2. Run by the Gorilla GroddDroid
The GroddDroid runner is based on uiautomator4 which
is a python wrapper to the Google API for testing pur-
pose. GroddDroid pushes the malware on the smartphone
and launches it main activity. For each displayed activity,
GroddDroid collects the graphical elements that may trigger
additional code. For now, we only collect Button objects as
our first objective is to trigger the maximum number of ac-
tivities. We could also manipulate forms, radio buttons, etc.
If clicking on the button leads to a new activity, GroddDroid
analyses it and repeat the same operation as before. Else, it
triggers the next element of the activity or gets back to the
previous activity. Of course, GroddDroid detects: dead-end
activities where nothing new can be activated: GroddDroid
generates the event "Go back button" to return to the pre-
vious activity; crashes: the application should be started
again and GroddDroid should return to the activity where
it crashed: the graphical element that triggered the crash
is blacklisted; loops: the current activity has already been
explored and GroddDroid should backtrack.
5.3. Code coverage comparison
Figure 2 studies the code coverage results of Grodd-
Droid, compared to the Monkey [14] and A3E [7]. For
this experiment, we used a large dataset of 100 malware
samples, as described later in Section 7.1. For each bar
of the graph, we compute the number of applications that
have the same coverage ratio. On the top graph, we con-
sider that a method has been covered if the runners enters
the method. On the bottom graph, we consider that a branch
is covered if the execution flow executes the first instruction
of the branch.
For the applications that have a low coverage (less than
15%), GroddDroid and Monkey have similar results. This
can be explained by the fact that some malware samples
crash just after being started: we observed 23 crashes for
our dataset of 100 malware. A3E has surprisingly lower
performances than the two others. We believe that, because
A3E has been released several years ago, the tool cannot
handle correctly more recent versions of Android applica-
tions. Thus, we want to emphasize that we believe that bet-
ter results could be obtained with A3E if the source code
was actualized. For coverages greater than 20%, Grodd-
Droid is slightly better than Monkey.
Of course, GroddDroid cannot go above 80%: it is well
known that executing 100% of the code is extremely diffi-
cult as it would require generating all possible inputs and to
be sure that no dead code is present. We give more precise
results in Section 7.
4https://github.com/xiaocong/uiautomator
Figure 2: Number of malware with same code coverage
6. Forcing malicious code to execute
In this section, we present the ability of GroddDroid to
force the conditional branches that have been identified as
an execution path leading to the instructions targeted by the
algorithm of Section 4. To identify how the control flow
should be modified, we build our analysis on a reference
execution. First, we compute an execution path from an
execution point belonging to the reference execution and
leading to the targeted suspicious code. Second, we modify
the application bytecode in order to force this new path.
6.1. Control-Flow Tracer
We use Soot to instrument the application bytecode and
add tracing information that allows us to know precisely
which methods and conditional branches have been ex-
plored by the GroddDroid runner. We use the Log class
of the Android API where the static method Log.i prints
informations in a system log that is readable in real-time.
The Control-Flow Tracer inserts calls to the Log.i method
with unique identifiers, called tags, at the beginning of each
method and conditional branch of the application. In the
case of large applications, this means that we have to add
thousands of these calls, but experiments have shown that it
can be reliably done on every tested application.
$r2 = new android.content.Intent
specialinvoke $r2.<init>
($r1, class "com.app/MyService")
$r1.startService($r2)
return
void com.app.MyService.onCreate ()
main activity
...
$r0 := @this
specialinvoke $r0.onCreate()
return
int com.app.MyService.onStartCommand
(android.content.Intent, int, int)
$r0 := @this
...
$r2.sendTextMessage("+3336303630", null, "PREMIUM", null, null)
$r2 = android.telephony.SmsManager.getDefault()
MyService.onCreate() MyService.onStartCommand(...)
Figure 3: Example of ACFG reconstruction for an activity starting a service
GroddDroid runner executes the application once these
calls are inserted in the bytecode. This execution forms
the reference execution. The printed tags are collected and
stored in the Log Collector (cf. Figure 1). Thus, Grodd-
Droid obtains the precise list of branches that have been
executed and not executed.
In the following, we explain how we compute an execu-
tion path that reaches these parts of the bytecode. We sup-
pose that we want to force a particular targeted method, e.g.
the most scored., and we show how we modify the reference
execution to force the execution of the targeted method.
6.2. Determining an execution path
Our algorithm that determines an execution path to a tar-
geted method is based on the control flow graph of the appli-
cation. We use control flow graphs (CFG) computed from
the bytecode: in these graphs, nodes are instructions of a
method and the directed edges between nodes represent the
possible succession of instructions. It is relatively easy to
compute the control flow graph of each method appearing
in the bytecode. Unfortunately, the computation of the con-
trol flow graph of the whole application is trickier.
We take as input the CFG of all methods. These graphs
have one entry point and possibly several output points.
Any point of a CFG C1 can be connected to an entry point of
another CFG C2 if there exists an inter-procedural flow from
C1 to C2, e.g. if a node of C1 is an instruction that invokes
the method whose CFG is C2. In addition to direct invo-
cations, there are also method calls that indirectly connect
two CFGs. These method calls are specific to Android and
are related to the creation of application components such
as activities and services. For example, to display a new
activity, developers must not instantiate an activity object
themselves, but rather call the startActivity method
of the Android API, with an Intent object as argument.
The system reacts to this API call by instantiating a new ac-
tivity object and calling its method onCreate. As Grace
et al. [15] reported, even though developers do not see ex-
plicitly the calls to onCreate, these system actions are
well-defined in the documentation. We exploit this knowl-
edge of the well-defined semantic of these API calls to de-
termine the implicit flows for the Android-specific behavior.
Thus, we created a control flow graph for the whole appli-
cation (called ACFG) from the union of CFGs of methods.
We give an example of reconstruction of an implicit flow
in Figure 3. In an application com.app, the main activ-
ity starts a service. The call $r1.startService($r2)
calls a method of $r1 which is a reference on this. Thus,
we cannot see the direct link to the method onCreate()
of MyService as it is called later by the system. The
system also calls, when the service is created, the method
onStartCommand where the service runs the functional
code e.g. in this example, the malicious code that sends
SMS. Thus, we analyze such special invocations and we
create the two dotted lines in the ACFG graph to reflect
these dependencies.
Once we have computed the ACFG, we can reconstruct
the shortest execution path, from a targeted instruction,
back to an entry point of the application, or to a method
that was executed during the reference execution. This par-
ticular execution path becomes our targeted execution path.
6.3. Forcing branches
We propose here to modify the bytecode of the applica-
tion to force the execution of our targeted execution path.
To achieve the forcing, we first collect the tags of condi-
tional jumps in the targeted execution path. Then, we re-
place each conditional jump that may divert the execution
from the targeted execution with an unconditional jump to
force the desired branches.
For example, Listing 3 shows a protection code that de-
termines if the execution takes place on an emulator, and
starts doing something suspicious otherwise. During a first
execution on a emulator, only the branch 1 would be ex-
plored. Listing 4 shows the same sample as Jimple. To
force the other branch of the conditional jump, we replace
it with an unconditional jump, pointing to the first Unit of
the branch 2, as shown by Listing 5.
if (isOnEmulator())
return; // Branch 1
else
manager = SmsManager.getDefault(); // Branch 2
Listing 3: Sample code of a conditional jump
$z0 = staticinvoke <DummyClass: boolean isOnEmulator()
>();
if $z0 != 0 goto label1;
return; // Branch 1
label1: // Branch 2
$r6 = staticinvoke <SmsManager: SmsManager getDefault()
>();
Listing 4: Same sample code, in Jimple
$z0 = staticinvoke <DummyClass: boolean isOnEmulator()
>();
goto label1; // Forced branch 2
return; // Branch 1
label1: // Branch 2
$r6 = staticinvoke <SmsManager: SmsManager getDefault()
>();
Listing 5: Same sample code with forced control flow
Then, we create a new version of the application with this
modified control-flow. This new version is a reduction of
the original one since it offers a strict subset of the possible
executions: all executions of the new version were possible
in the original application. Finally, the modified APK with
one or several control flow modifications is rebuilt and ex-
ecuted by GroddDroid. With a new run, the runner should
collect new tags in the Log Collector, indicating that the
previously unexplored branches have been executed, thus
triggering the possibly malicious parts of the code.
7. Experiments
7.1. Experimenting the targeting algorithm
To evaluate the soundness of the targeting algorithm pre-
sented in section 4, we have used a small collection of seven
malware namely the Kharon15 dataset. Every malware be-
longing to the dataset has been manually reversed in order
to be able to locate and understand its malicious code. More
precisely, malware in this dataset have been picked from the
Genome Project [25] and Contagio mobile5 and are samples
of BadNews (2013), a remote administration tool [19]; Ca-
jino (2015), a spyware; DroidKungFu (2011), a remote ad-
ministration tool [25]; MobiDash (2014), an agressive ad-
ware; SaveMe (2015), a spyware; SimpleLocker (2014), a
ransomware; WipeLocker (2014), a data eraser.
We have run the targeting algorithm presented in Sec-
tion 4.1 on these malware and we wanted to know if our
5http://contagiominidump.blogspot.fr/
Table 3: Scoring results on the kharon dataset
Malware Highest
ranked
method
Successful
Targeting
Most scored method
BadNews 80 ok gathers user information
(phone number, IMEI, ...)
Cajino 200 ok sends SMS with parameters
from a C&C server
DroidKungFu 50 ok starts a binary containing the
exploit udev
MobiDash 147 wrong gathers user information for
legitimate use
SaveMe 100 ok sends SMS with parameters
from a C&C server
SimpleLocker - crash -
WipeLocker 150 ok sends SMS
algorithm was able to point out the code identified as ma-
licious by the manual analysis. Table 3 details these first
results. This first analysis is promising: except one analysis
that has crashed, and one analysis (MobiDash) that ranked
first a legitimate method but found other methods with sec-
ondary scores containing malicious code, the highest ranked
methods correspond to the malicious behavior of malware.
We have also evaluated the results provided by the tar-
geting algorithm on a larger dataset. This second dataset
has not been as much studied as the previous used dataset
but it contains a higher diversity of malicious codes. This
second dataset contains one hundred malware samples ob-
tained from AndroTotal. We evaluate how many methods
are scored by the targeting algorithm and computes the dis-
tribution of the score value on this larger dataset. Results are
represented graphically, for each malware numbered from
1 to 100 on the x axis, in Figure 4. For each malware we
draw a square when a method is scored by the heuristic. The
higher the score is, the darker the associated color is. This
second experiment shows that the heuristic has computed a
score greater than 0 for 83 malware over 100. Moreover, a
malware has, on average, 1410 methods and 12.34 methods
with a score greater than 0. In other words, less than one
percent of bytecode methods are considered as potentially
malicious by our targeting algorithm. Furthermore, 35.82%
of the methods that are scored have a score higher than 25
which is shown by the light gray squares on Figure 4. Only
15 malware present high scored methods (greater than 150).
This second experiment allows us to conclude that our tar-
geting algorithm identifies only few methods in the malware
code which reduces the scope of further analysis.
Lastly Figure 6 depicts the genome of the second dataset,
as seen by our heuristic. Many malware use telephony calls
(IMEI, etc.) and also manipulate SMS. The use of the net-
work is of course a common usage and cryptographic prim-
itives are used in 27 cases.
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7.2. Experimenting GroddDroid forcing
To conclude, we have forced the execution of the most
scored method for each malware appearing on the two
datasets. Our experiments have been done on a Nexus 5
smartphone under Android 4.4, connected to a Quad core
PC with 4GB of RAM. Before executing each malware,
we reinstall a fresh operating system in order to delete any
modifications that the previous malware would have done.
On the large dataset, we obtain a coverage of 16.31% of the
methods (10.07% of all branches). When the highest scored
method is not executed, GroddDroid runs a second run and
forces the required branches. We obtain an extra +0.19%
of covering for methods (+0.41% for branches). As ex-
pected, the increase is greater for branches as GroddDroid
forces control flow conditions. These results are better than
the coverages obtained with the Monkey (14.99% for meth-
ods, 9.35% for branches) or with A3E (1.46% for methods,
0.49% for branches). Figures 5 and 7 show the method and
branch covering ratio of GroddDroid (green) for the 100
malware, numbered on the x axis from 1 to 100. The extra
bar on the top (in black) represents the additional coverage
obtained by GroddDroid when it forces branches.
If we just consider the suspicious methods that have
been identified by the heuristic of Section 4, then the cov-
ering of these methods goes up to 24% without any forc-
ing. If GroddDroid forces branches, the covering of the
suspicious methods obtains an extra value of +4%. On the
other hand, Monkey executes 20% of the targeted methods.
Thus, in total, GroddDroid succeeds in executing 28% of
the suspicious methods with an additional +8% compared
to Monkey. Note that this additional performance result of
+8% is reduced by the fact that 23 malware crash during
the first seconds of execution. Naturally, for these ones,
GroddDroid will never be able to reach the targeted method,
similarly to Monkey or A3E. For a few malware samples,
GroddDroid does not succeed in launching the application.
This is because the malware has no main activity and is only
triggered with a system event or should be started as a ser-
vice. We need to add this feature for GroddDroid in future
works, in order to launch the required services or intents.
8. Conclusion
We have presented GroddDroid, a framework dedicated
to the discovery and the automatic execution of malicious
codes driven by static analysis of the application bytecode.
The originality of GroddDroid is its ability to force branches
in order to reach the suspicious code despite of the malware
developer’s countermeasures that protect its triggering.
Experimental results on a well studied set of malware
samples showed that the targeting phase is accurate. For a
dataset of 100 malware, GroddDroid succeeds in executing
16.31% of the methods on average. Using its ability to force
branches, GroddDroid targets the suspicious methods and
additionally succeeds in executing +0.19% of all methods.
Thus, for the methods that are scored as the most suspicious,
GroddDroid obtains an executing ratio of 28%.
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